Fiscal Union Without Factor Union: Optimal VAT under Monopolistic Competition
This paper studies optimal destination-based VAT in an open economy with monopolistic competition, endogenous entry, asymmetric fiscal needs and international transfers.
Research Fellow in Economics · CY Cergy Paris Université · THEMA (CNRS)
I study how taxation, market power and international integration shape resource allocation, firm location and income distribution.
Profile
I am an economist affiliated with CY Cergy Paris Université and THEMA. I received my PhD in Economics in 2025. My research examines the design of tax policy in integrated economies, with particular attention to destination- and origin-based commodity taxation, monopolistic competition, firm mobility, labour-market heterogeneity and welfare.
My current projects also study market power in overlapping-generations economies and the distributional effects of imperfect competition. I combine theoretical models, numerical methods and empirical calibration to derive policy-relevant results.
Selected work
My work focuses on tax design, firm location, market power and distribution in open economies.
This paper studies optimal destination-based VAT in an open economy with monopolistic competition, endogenous entry, asymmetric fiscal needs and international transfers.
A comparison of destination- and origin-based commodity taxation when firms are mobile and skilled wages respond endogenously. Submitted to International Tax and Public Finance in 2026.
Joint with Pascal Belan. The project studies market power, capital accumulation and intergenerational and intragenerational redistribution.
Teaching
National accounting, short-run equilibrium, growth and macroeconomic policy.
Consumer choice, producer theory, market equilibrium and welfare.
Quantitative foundations and applied policy evaluation.
Contact
For research discussions, seminar invitations or collaboration, please use my institutional email.